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ABSTRACTS
Katherine Kempfer*

ALIENS - ELIGIBILITY OF ARAl3IAN TO CITIZENSHIP - Petition of
Ahmed Hassan to be admitted a citizen of the United States. While petitioner's
skin is dark brown, even darker than that of other Arabs, he claimed that Arabs
are remote descendants of the Caucasian or white race, and therefore eligible for
citizenship under the federal statute 1 as "white persons." Held, petition denied.

* Managing Editor,
1

MICHIGAN LAw REVIEW.
Nationality Act of 1940, § 303, 54 Stat. L. 1140, 8 U. S. C. (1940), § 703.

u94

MIGHIGAN LAw·REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The color of the skin of a particular individual is not material, although the burden is on the claimant to show that he is a member of a particular group. But in
deciding whether the group is eligible for citizenship, the test is not how ethnologists would classify the group in question, but what Congress meant by the
term "white person" when the statute was first enacted in 1790. The court
found that petitioner is an Arab and that Arabs belong to the Mohammedan
world and have a culture entirely different from the predominantly Christian
peoples of Europe from whom most early immigrants to America came. Most of
the Arabian peninsula is not in the zone from which immigration is specifically
excluded, but it does not follow that all those outside this zone are "white
persons." In re Hassan, (D. C. Mich. 194~) 48 F. Supp. 843. 2
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT RIGHT OF ATTORNEY TO COMPENSATION
FROM STATE FOR SERVICES IN DEFENSE OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT

-Attorney R was appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant on a
burglary charge. At the dose of the trial tb.e judge ordered the county to pay R
$75 for his services. Upon the county's refusal to pay, R brought a petition for
mandamus. The county's demurer to the petition was overruled and upon the
writ being granted the county appealed. Held, writ 'bf mandamus vacated. In
the absence of a statute, an attorney is not entitled to compensation for his services in defending an indigent defendant. An attorney is an officer of the court
and the office must be accepted with its burdens as well as its p~ivileges. It has
long been recognized that it is the duty of an attorney to render his services
gratuitously to indigent defendants at the suggestion of the court. This requirement is not a taking of property without due compensation, for the practice of
law is not one of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ruckenbrod '{J, Mullins, (Utah, 1943) 133 P. (2d) 325.1
BANKRUPTCY-_ AccouNT.Al3ILITY OF RECEIVER APPOINTED IN STATE

CouRT-The case ofEmil 'fJ. Hanley,1 noted in our December issue, has been
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. The principal ground for the
decision was that a contrary interpretation of the Chandler Act, requiring a receiver appointed by a state court in a mortgage foreclosure to account to the
trustee in a later bankruptcy proceeding, would lead to a division of authority
between state and federal courts whereby the foreclosure would proceed in the
state court but the funds collected would be turned over to the bankruptcy court
for administration. In re Russell, Inc., (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 687.

2 See McGovney, "Race Discrimination in Naturalization," 8 IowA. L. REV. 129,
2II (1923); 23 MINN. L. REv. 813 (1939) (Parsee from India as "white person").

\ See annotation on compensation by public of attorney for services under appointment by court in defending indigent person charged with crime, 130 A. L. R. 1439
(1941); note, 12 FoRDHAM L. REv, 175 (1943).
1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 369, noted 41 MICH L. REv. 519 (1942),
6 UNIV, DETROIT L. J. 87 (1943).
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BILLS AND NOTES - IMPOSTER - RULE AS TO OBLIGATION OF UNITED
STATES - In 19 3 I, upon the representation ( apparently in person). of one
Harry Ott that he was the Harry T. Goulding named in a veteran's adjusted
service certificate and presentation of a notary's certification to that effect, the
veteran's bureau in Albuquerque, New Mexico, accepted the certificate, together
with his application for a loan and promissory note, and issued a check payable to
the order of Harry T. Goulding. The check was mailed to a hotel where Harry
Ott had registered under the name of Harry T. Goulding. Ott presented the
check to the defendant in this action, First National Bank of Albuquerque, who
cashed it after verifying the identification over the telephone with the attesting
notary and examining identifying documents in Ott's possession. The bank endorsed the check "prior endorsements guaranteed" and negotiated it to the
Denver branch of the Federal Reserve, where it was paid in the regular course
of business. The fraud was discovered by the United States in 1937 and after
repeated demands against the bank the present suit was instituted in 1940. The
trial court gave judgment for the bank. Held, affirmed. When the United
States becomes a party to commercial paper it impliedly consents ·to be bound by
the same rules governing private persons under the same circumstances. As New
Mexico has not spoken on the question, this will be assumed to be the uniform
negotiable instruments law. Under the generally accepted "imposter" rule, it is
held that where a check is paid on the endorsement of an imposter who is nevertheless the same person to whom the drawer delivered the check under the mistaken belief that he was the person whose name he had assumed, there is no
forgery of the endorsement and the drawer cannot recover from the payee bank
or from an intermediary bank on its endorsement. The facts of the present case
present a clear situation for the application of this rule. United States v. First
Nat. Bank of Albuquerque, (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 985, cert. den.
(U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 830.1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION TO REGULATE CHAIN BROADCASTING-' Beginning in 1938, the
Federal Communications Commission held hearings, and in 1941 it issued its
report and proposed regulations, made final after briefs and oral arguments by
interested persons. These regulations provide that licenses shall not be granted to
1 A very similar case is noted in 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 112 (1939). There are
numerous discussions of imposter cases: 37 M1cH. L. REv. 126 (1938); 18 BosT.
UNIV. L. REv. 148 (1938); 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 220 (1938); 38 CoL. L. REv. 171
(1938); 23 CoRN. L. Q. 307 (1938); 7 FoRDHAM L. REv. 106 (1938); 26 GEO.
L. J. 497 (1938); 32 ILL. REv. REv. 731 (1938); 25 lowA L. REv. 154 (1939);
22 MINN. L. REv. 548 (1938); 15 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REv. 289 (1938); 13 NOTRE
DAME LAWY. 209 (1938); 86 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 209 (1937); 12'TEMP. L. Q. 253
(1938); 24 VA. L. REv. 192 (1927); Abel, "The Imposter Payee: Or, Rhode Island
was Right," 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161, 362.
See annotation on who must bear loss as between drawer or indorser who delivers
check to an imposter and one who purchases, cashes or pays it upon the imposter's indorsement: 22 A. L. R. 1228 (1922); 52 A. L. R. 1326 (1928); 112 A. L. R. 1435
( 193 8). On rights and remedies of drawer of check against bank which receives it on
a forged indorsement and collects it from drawee bank, 102 A. L. R. 145 (1936).
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stations which enter into contracts with a network organization of the following
character: contracts hindering the station from broadcasting programs of another
network; contracts hindering another station in the same area from broadcasting programs of the same network; contracts for longer than two years; contracts granting more than a prescribed amount of option time or giving exclusive
options; contracts preventing the rejection of a program which in the station's
opinion is unsatisfactory, unsuitable or contrary to public interest; contracts preventing the station from fixing its rates for the sale of broadcast time other than
·for the network broadcasts. It was also provided that a license should not be
issue,d to any person or network having more than one station in any one service
area. The National Broadcasting Company and the Columbia Broadcasting
System each brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of these regulations, and
the effectiveness of the regulations has been postponed from time to time pending judicial determination of their constitutionality. After the Supreme Court
had reversed its dismissal of the suit for want of jurisdiction 1 the district
court heard the case on the merits and again dismissed. 2 On appeal it was
argued that the regulations went beyond the authority given the commission by
the Communications Act of 1934 3 or that the act was an unconstitutional delegation of power, that the commission misconstrued the scope of its power, that
the regulatioi:is are arbitrary and capricious, and abridge the right of free speech.
Held, the regulations are valid. Congress did not intend to limit the authority
of the commission to engineering and technical regulations. The nature of
radio makes it necessary to limit the number or stations in order to prevent a
chaoti~ condition in which none can be heard, and the history of the commission
shows that this was its major purpose. Some method, then, must be followed
for choosing who shall be allowed to operate a broadcasting station. The act
provides that the grant of licenses shall be based on the public interest, convenience and necessity, thus implying a wide field of regulation, and the Congressional reports also indicate that the commission was to have broad powers.
The public interest standard is sufficiently definite. The provision in the act that
the commission may refuse a license to anyone who has been convicted of violating antitrust laws does not mean that the commission must wait for a conviction
under those laws before refusing a license on the ground of restraint of trade.
The Court cannot say that the regulations are arbitrary and capricious. Nor are
they an abridgement of the right of free speech. Radio, unlike other modes of
expression, is not inherently available to all, and is therefore subject to government regulation. The basis for that regulation is made the public interest, and
the granting of a license does not depend on political, economic or social views
or any other capricious basis. Justices Murphy and Roberts dissented on the
1 (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 688, reversed Columbia Broadcasting System
v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 62 S. Ct. 1194 (1942), National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 447, 62 S. Ct. 1214 (1942), noted 41 M1cH. L. REv. 316
(1942); 42 CoL. L. REv. 1197 (1942); 56 HARV. L. REv. 121 (1942); 18 IND.
L. J. 127 (1943); 21 N. C. L. REv. 316 (1942); IO UNiv. Cm. L REv. 88 (1942).
2 National Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., (App. D. C.
1942) 132 F. (2d) 545, noted 31 GEo. L. J. So (1942).
3 48 Stat. L. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S. C. (1940), § 151 et seq.
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ground that the statute did not clearly give the commission authority to regulate
network broadcasts. Justices Black and Rutledge did not participate. National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 997. 4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FEDERAL COURTS - VALIDITY OF PRICE CONTROL ACT GIVING EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO EMERGENCY COURT OF APPEALS - Appellants were wholesale meat dealers and brought suit in a federal
district court to enjoin defendant federal district attorney from prosecuting pending criminal proceedings against appellants for violation of the Emergency Price
Control Act 1 and Maximum Price Regulations No. 169.2 Appellants had not
availed themselves of any of the procedure set up by the act for protesting the
price regulations or the appeals provided to the Emergency Court and to the
Supreme Court. The district court dismissed the suit. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The statute giving exclusive jurisdiction to grant equitable relief from the Emergency Price Control Act to the Emergency Court and appeal therefrom to the
Supreme Court is valid. Federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, derive
their jurisdiction wholly from the constitutional power of Congress to "ordain
and establish" inferior courts. 8 There is nothing to require Congress to confer
equity jurisdiction on any particular federal court. Nor can the act be interpreted as forbidding the Emergency Court to declare the act unconstitutional.
The Court did not determine whether courts other than the Emergency Court
may consider the constitutionality of the act in a suit for some other purpose,
such as a defense to a criminal prosecution. Lockerty v. Phillips, (U. S. 1943)
63 S. Ct. 1019.4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- POWER OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TO
LICENSE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS LITERATURE-The city of Jeannette,
Pennsylvania, had an ordinance, enacted some forty years ago, imposing a license
fee of $1.50 a day or $7 a week on persons soliciting orders for merchandise of
any kind or delivering articles under orders so obtained. Petitioners were "Jehovah's Witnesses" and went from door to door distributing religious books and
pamphlets. Sometimes a "contribution" of a certain sum was requested, sometimes it was stated that the "price" of the book was a certain amount, and occasionally the books were given free. Petitioners were arrested and convicted
under the above licensing ordinance. The convictions were sustained by the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was denied. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, judgment reversed. The ordinance is invalid as applied to persons selling

J.

4

See discussion of the broadcasting regulations in 5 I

1

56 Stat. L. 23 (1942), 50 U.S. C. A. (Supp. 1943), Appendix,§ 901 et seq.
7 FED. REG. 4653, 4798, 6659 (1942).

2

YALE

L.

448 ( I 942).

U. S. Const., art. 3, § l.
See generally on price control, 41 M1cH. L. REV. 109 (1942). On constitutionality, see Aidlin, "Constitutionality of 1942 Price Control Act," 30 CAL. L. REV.
648 (1942); 37 ILL. L. REv. 256 (1942). On enforcement by state court, see II
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 348 (1943).
3

4
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religious literature. The judgment in Jones v. Op_elika has been vacated.1 The
hand distribution of religious tracts is a form of evangelism as old as the printing
press. As a recognized religious practice it is protected by the First Amendment
and cannot be restricted by taxation. The amount of the fee prescribed in the
ordinance under question is more than nominal and is flat tax. Justices Reed,
Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson dissented. 2 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, (U.S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 87?.8

a

CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw - VALIDITY AND APPLICATION OF STATUTE GovERNING APPORTIONMENT OF INCOME BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN OF TRUST IN MoRTGAGE SALVAGE OPERATIONS -When a
mortgage held in trust is foreclosed and title to the property acquired by the
trustee, the New York Personal Property Law 1 lays down rules for the subse·quent "salvage operations." In 1940 the law was modified retroactively to allot
to the life tenant out of net income an annual amount up to three per cent of the
face value of the mortgage investment, this payment to be final and not subject
to recoupment either from the life tenant or from the trustee or executor by way
of surcharge. The validity of this provision as applied retroactively was questioned in a proceeding for an intermediate account by a trustee. Of the nine
mortgages involved, two had been sold before the date the act became effective.
Held, affirming the surrogate 2 and the appellate division,8 that the statute is
valid. Under the common law the trustee had discretion to pay all or any portion
of the net income to the life tenant, although this discretion was seldom exercised because of fear of possible surcharge. However, it would seem that three
per cent is a reasonable amount for the life tenant and for which the remainderman should not be allowed to surcharge the executor. Certainly the life tenant
could not demand of right any greater amount. Since, therefore, the statute
1 316 U. S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231 (1942), ordered varated and judgments of
state courts reversed, (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 890, The Opelika case was noted in
41 MICHL. REv. 323 (1942) and in the following {all t942): 36 AM. PqL. Sci. REV.
1053; 2 BILL RTS. REv. 290; 12 BROOKLYN L. REv. 71; 20 CHI-KENT L. REv. 349;
42 CoL. L. REv. 1200; II FORDHAM L. REv. 304; I I GEo. WASH. L. REv. II4; 31
GEo. L. J. 64; 17 lND. L. J. 555; 27 MINN. L. REv. 90; 91 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 75;
29 VA. L. REv 339; 52 YALE L J. 168. See also Heller, "A Turning Point for Religious Liberty," 29 VA. L. REv. 440 (1943); Miner, "Religion and the Law," 21
CHI-KENT. L. REV. 156 (1943).
2 The first decision in the Opelika case was also a fiye to four decision, and the
deciding vote in the reversal was cast by Justice Rutledge, recently appointed to fill the
vacancy caused by the resignation of Justice Byrnes.
8 ln Martin v. Struthers, (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 862, decided the same day,
the Court held invalid an ordinance making it unlawful for any person distributing
handbills or circulars to ring the doorbell or sound the door knocker of a residence.
In Douglas v. Jeanette, (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 877, the Court declined to enjoin
the enforcement against Jehovah's Witnesses of an ordinance similar to that in the
Murdock case, on the ground that no case for equitable relief had been made.

N. Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney, Supp. 1942), § 17-c (2).
,175 Misc. 1044, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 622 (1941).
3 264 App. Div. 701, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 405 (1942).

1

2
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merely requires what was perm.issible under the common law, it is valid and
does not take property or impair contract rights or due process. The court construed the statute to apply to all cases where liquidatio_n of the property is incomplete and so to the two properties which were foreclosed before the date of enactment but still in the hands of the trustees at that time. Two judges dissented.
In re West?s Estate, 289 N. Y. 423, 46 N. E. (2d) 501 (1943)."
COSTS - SEPARATE SUIT FOR. CoS'I'S :BY SuccEssFuL PAR.TY IN FoRMER
SUIT - Plaintiff sued to recover attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in a
former suit against the same defendant whereby defendant had been held to be
constructive trustee of certain property for plaintiff. The trial court originally
sustained defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed
to state a cause on action, but the appellate court reversed. 1 On the trial thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff. Held, reversed. At common
law costs were never recoverable and any allowance therefor must be based on
statute. Neither is there any separate action for costs by a successful litigant. If
such were permitted, there would be an endless chain of suits. Ritter 'II. Ritter,
(Ill. 1943) 46 N.E. (2d) 41.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-WITNESSES-STATUTE GR.ANTING
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO WITNESS - NECESSITY OF ASSERTING
PRIVILEGE - Defendant, with others, was indicted for conspiracy to fix prices
in violation of the Sherman Act. Defendant .filed a special plea in bar alleging
that he had, in obedience to subpoena, appeared as a witness for the United
States before the grand jury inquiring into the matters charged in the indictment
and had given testimony substantially connected with the transactions covered by
the indictment. The United States demurred to the plea on the ground that it
did not allege that the witness had asserted any claim of privilege against selfincrimination. The district court overruled the demurrer and the case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act.1
Held, the Sherman Act gives immunity from prosecution to a witness testifying in obedience to subpoena 2 and makes no mention of the necessity that the
witness claim privilege. Other similar statutes do insert this additional require4 Cases on allocation between principal and income of amount received on foreclosure of mortgage or other dispositions of property securing principal and interest of
indebtedness are collected in 103 A. L. R. 1271 at 1288 (1936); II5 A. L. R. 881
at 884 (1938); n6 A. L. R. 1354 at 1356 (1938); 129 A. L. R. 1314 at 1328
(1940); 142 A. L. R. 264 at 266 (1943). See also Wilson, "The Life Tenant and
Unproductive Property," 10 TEMP. L. Q. 376 (1936); comment on apportionment
by trustee of unproductive mortgage property between life tenant and remainderman,
49 HARV. L. REV. 805 (1936).

1 308 Ill. App. 337, 32 N. E. (2d) 185 (1942), noted 40 MICH. L. REv. II8
(1941); 21 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 550 (1941); 8 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 760 (1941).

1 34 Stat. L. 1246 (1907), ¥ amended by 56 Stat. L. 271 (1942), 18 U.S. C. A.
(Supp. 1943), § 682.
2 32 Stat. L. 904 (1903), as amended by 34 Stat. L. 798 (1906), 15 U. S. C.
(1940), §§ 32, 33.
.
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ment and it would have been easy for Congress to alter the Sherman Act. The
gov,ernment argues that such a construction may trap the prosecution into granting immunity to a witness when it _does not know at the time of subpoena to
what extent the witness may have participated in the crime; but the government's construction would permit the witness to be trapped. Justice Frankfurter
dissented, in an opinion in which Justice Douglas concurred, on the ground that
the whole history of immunity statutes and their interpretation by the courts for
seventy years showed that Congress never intended to grant a general amnesty
to a witness subpoenaed by the government, but only to permit the government
to draw out testimony on specific matters as to which a witness might claim
privilege. United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 63 S. Ct. 409 (1943). 8
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION - CONSTRUCTION OF CALIFORNIA STATUTE
As To DESCENT OF ANCESTRAL PROPERTY WHERE THERE ARE BoTH PATERNAL AND MATERNAL CousINs OF WHOLE AND HALF BLO<?D - In a proceeding to determine heirship in the estate of Katherine Ryan, it appeared that there
were twenty-six first cousins of the decedent. In both the paternal and maternal
lines there were some cousins of the half blood. The California Probate Code,
section 254, provides: "Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of
the whole blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance came to the intestate
by descent, devise, or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those
who are not of the blood of such ancestor must be excluded from such inheritance
in favor of those who are." The trial court ordered the estate distributed
equally among all twenty-six cousins. Held on appeal, the maternal half blood
cousins must be excluded from sharing in the paternal ancestral property and the
paternal half blood cousins from the maternal ancestral property, Under early
English law collateral relatives of the half blood were entirely excluded from inheritance. And under the rule of ancestral property, even full blood kindred on
the paternal side were excluded from sharing in property inherited on the
mother's side and vice versa. In California the ancestral rule has never applied
as to kindred of the whole blood.1 The code provision as to kindred of the half
blood, while going beyond the common law in permitting inheritance in some
cases, enacts the common law of ancestral property as to them. It seems a purposeless distinction by the legislature to forbid half bloods on the nonancestral
side to share in ancestral property while allowing full bloods on the nonancestral
- side to share. But even more purposeless is respondent's contention that "in favor
of those who are" means "in favor of those full blood kindred" and that therefore wherever there are half blood kindred on the ancestral .side, half blood relatives on the opposite side cannot be excluded. Moreover, we have already held
- that "all those who are not of the blood" refers to half bloods only,2 so the third
3 The question presented is one on which the federal lower courts have been
sharply divided. See cases cited by Court in principal case, 63 S. Ct. 409, note 2.
Also 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 160 (1939). And see generally 49 YALE L. J. 1059, esp.
1075-76 (1940); 27 A. L. R. 139 (1923).

I

1

In re Pearsons' Estate, IIO Cal. 524, 42 P. 960 (1896). And see Cal. Prob.
Code (Deering, 1941), § 226 .
• 2 In re Pearsons' Estate, supra.
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"those" must mean half bloods also. But the doctrine of ancestral estates is
being looked on with increasing disfavor and we construe section 254 as applying to realty only. In re Ryan's Estate, (Cal. 1943) 133 P. (2d) 626. 3
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION - EFFECT OF RENUNCIATION OF HEIR'S
INTESTATE SHARE - RIGHT OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR -Adda Coomes died
intestate on January 26, 1941, seized of a certain tract of land, and left surviv,
ing her husband, the plaintiff, and seven children. There was at that time outstanding against Lola Miller, one of the daughters, and her husband a judgment
in favor of defendant. Mrs. Miller renounced her intestate share in the estate by
an instrument properly recorded. All the other children quitclaimed their rights
to their father, and this deed was also recorded. Defendant levied upon the land
for Mrs. Miller's one-twelfth interest and plaintiff sought an injunction. Held,
injunction denied. There was no attempt to prove that the renunciation was
made with intent to defraud creditors, so the case turns solely on the effect of a
renunciation of an intestate share. The point seems to be one of first impression
in the United States. It has frequently been held that a testamentary trust, bequest or devise may be renounced by the beneficiary and that the renunciation
will relate back to the date of death so as to cut off any rights of the beneficiary's
creditors. But an intestate share is different; no assent by the beneficiary is
necessary and title vests instantly by operation of law. Coomes v. Finegan,
(Iowa, 1943) 7 N. W. (2d) 729. 1
DIVORCE - EsTOPPEL TO QuEsTION VALIDITY OF NEVADA DIVORCE EFFECT OF WILLIAMS v. NoRTH CAROLINA -Appellant, Charles Brogan,
sought a statutory share as surviving spouse in the estate of Martha Brogan Bingham. Appellant and decedent were married in Ireland in 1887 and shortly
thereafter moved to New York City, where they lived together until they
separated in I 909. In I 9 I 3 decedent went to Nevada and obtained a divorce.
Appellant did not appear in the action but was personally served by summons in
New York City. Thereafter in 1922 appellant entered into a ceremonial marriage with another woman, stating in his license application that he had been
previously married and divorced. Decedent died in 1941. The surrogate 1 held
the Nevada divorce invalid, but found that appellant had estopped himself from
denying its validity. On appeal, held, that Williams v. North Carolina 2 does
not control since the surrogate expressly found that the decedent went to Nevada
3
Cases on right of inheritance in ancestral property as between kindred of whole
and half blood are collected in 141 A. L. R. 976 (1942) and see note on Minnesota
case, 2 7 MINN. L. REV. 3 l 3 ( l 94 3) . See also Pierson, "The Ancestral Status of Personal Property," 16 -GEo. L. J. 341 (1928); Simes, "Ancestral and Non-Ancestral
Realty under the Ohio Statutes of Descent," 2 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 387 (1928); 17
TENN. L. REV. 775 (1942).

1

Cf. effect on inheritance taxation of renunciation of property passing by will or
descent, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 632.
1

178 Misc. 801, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 584 (1943).
(U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 207. See Holt, "The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock,"
41 M1cH. L. REv. 1013, supra.
2
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for the sole purpose of giving the Nevada court colorable jurisdiction of the divorce proceeding. But appellant by his remarriage has estopped himself from
questioning the validity of that divorce. In re Bingham's Will, 265 App. Div.
463, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 756 (1943).s
ExEcuToRs AND ADMINISTRATORS - SuccEssION TO OFFICE OF ExEcuT0R WHERE EXECUTOR BANK CONSOLIDATES WITH ANOTHER BANK -The
City Trust Company, a state banking corporation, was executor under the will
of W, who died in 1930. In 1931, the trust company consolidated with the
Howard National Bank, under a federal statute,1 as the Howard National Bank
& Trust Company. Thereafter the latter acted as executor on the assumption
that it had succeeded to the office by the consolidation. In I 94 I the various
persons interested under the will joined in a petition to the probate court to appoint an administrator with the will annexed. The probate court granted the
petition and the Howard Ni!tional_ Bank excepted. Held, affirmed. The consolidation of a state· bank with a national bank, though not provided for by
state statute, was valid under the federal statute in the absence of a state statute
forbidding it. The consolidation left the charter of the City Trust Company in
a condition of suspended animation, but the charter has since been revoked for
failure to pay the annual license tax. The office of executor, unlike that of administrator, which depends on appointment by the court, is a position of personal
trust. It is not a contract or property right and cannot be transferred. In re
Watkins' Estate, (Vt. 1943) 30 A. (2d) 305.2
FEDERAL COURTS - APPLICATION OF STATE RULES GOVERNING J0INDER
OF THIRD PARTIES - An action for personal injuries in an automobile accident
was brought in a federal district court in New York on the ground of diversity
of citizenship. Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
defendant sought to bring in the owner of the car in which the plaintiffs were
riding. Under New York law, defendant could make no claim for contribution
against a joint tortfeasor, not joined in the original action, until after judgment
was rendered. The district court dismissed the third party complaint.1· On
appeal to the circuit court of appeals, held affirmed. The cases setting forth the
New York rule constitute substantive law, not mere procedure, and under the
rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 2 the federal court must follow them despite the
, 8 For discussions of estoppel of the divorce defendant to question validity of the
divorce, see Jacobs, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 M1cH. L. REv. 789 at 778
(1936) ;_38 CoL. L. REv. 1501 (1938); 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 520 (1940); 49 YALE
L. J. u30 (1940); 109 A. L. R. 1018 at 1023 (1937); 122 A. L. R. 1321 at 1326
(1939).

44 Stat. L. 1225 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S. C. (1<)40), § 34a.
See annotations on changes in corporate organization as affecting status as trustee,
executor, administrator or guardian, 61 A. L. R. 994 (1929); 131 A. L. R. 753
(1941).
1

2

1 Thompson v. Cranston, (D. C. N. Y. 1942) 2 F. R. D. 270, noted 28 CoRN.
L. Q. 89 (1942).
2 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938), noted 36 M1cH. L. REv. 1312 (1938).
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greater desirability of the federal rule. Brown v. Cranston, (C. C. A. 2d,
1942) 132 F. (2d) 631, cert. den. Cranston v. Thompson, (U.S. 1943) 63
S. Ct. 1028.3
FEDERAL CouRTS-JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT IN Sun ON ToTAL DrsABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACT - FUTURE CONTINGENCIES - Plaintiff sued
in a court of Kentucky on a total disability insurance contract. Defendant had
the suit removed to the federal district court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff moved to remand the action to the state court. The question
turned on whether the suit involved the jurisdictional amount of $3,000. The
contract called for the payment of $50 monthly during disability. Plaintiff
·sought judgment in the amount of $700 for payments presently due. Defendant
showed that plaintiff's life expectancy was more than ten years, which might
involve payments of $6,000, and that it was required to keep a reserve on the
contract of about $8,000. Held, plaintiff's motion to remand sustained. The
question whether reserves may be counted in the jurisdictional amount is one on
which there has been much conflict in the lower federal courts, but no decision
by the Supreme Court, and this court prefers the rule that the reserve is merely
incidental and is not the amount in controversy. On the question whether future
payments under an installment contract may be counted as the amount in controversy, there is also much conflict, but this court prefers the rule, impliedly
approved by the Supreme Court,1 that they may not be so included. This rule
is not affected by the unusual form of Kentucky judgment in cases of total disability benefits which provides that the plaintiff shall recover the stipulated
amount in the future with the right in the defendant to reopen the case upon a
change in the circumstances, for such a judgment is simply a declaration that
certain amounts will come due in the future. Button v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
New York, (D. C. Ky. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 168.2
HABEAS CoRPus-SELECTIVE SERVICE Ac-r--MoMENT OF INDUCTIONThe case of Ex parte Billings/ ·abstracted in the February issue,2 has been affirmed. Billings v. Truesdell, (C.C.A. roth, 1943) r r U. S. L. W. 2795.
3
See generally on effect of Erie case on federal rules: Holtzoff, "The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," 24 J. AM. Juo. Soc. 57
(1940); IO DUKE B. A. J. 20 (1942); 30 GEO. L. J. 73 (1941); 140 A. L. R.
717 (1942).

1

Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 276 U.S. 602, 48 S. Ct. 323 (1928), affirming (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) 19 F. (2d) 117.
2
See 9 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 339 (1942) (future payments); 51 HARV. L. REV.
1109 (1938) (insurance reserves); 25 MrNN. L. REV. 356 (1941) (insurance contracts generally); Dobie, "Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Courts,"
38 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1925); 8 Mo. L. REv. 131 (1943).
1

(D. C. Kan. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 663, noted 21 N. C. L. REv. 301 (1943).

Cf. 27 MrNN. L. REV. 474 (1943).
2

41 MrcH. L. REv. 759 (1943).
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INSURANCE - CONTRACT TO FURNISH MEDICAL SERVICES -The state
brought action to recover the statutory penalty from defendant corporation,
Community Health Service, for conducting an insurance business without license.
Defendant makes contracts with licensed physicians under which they agree to
render professional services to those members of the general public who contract
with defendant. The physicians receive their compensation on an annual basis,
whether or not they render services therefor. The lower court found for defendant. Held, affirmed. The defendant does not undertake to pay such debts
as the subscnoer may incur for medical service or to indemnify the subscriber
against any loss. The physicians are paid a .fixed amount and the company cannot be called upon to expend further 1,ll0ney than they have already paid or
agreed to pay. Neither as between the corporation and the physician nor as between the physician and the subscriber is the compensation affected by any contingency' or risk. Commissioner of Banking and Insurance v. Community
Health Service, (N. J. L. 1943) 30 A. (2d) 44.1
JUDGMENTS -

DECLARATORY

] UDGMENTS-AVAILAl3ILITY

AGAINST

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
against the city civil service board to construe a certain section of the Los Angdes city charter. The trial court held that a municipal corporation is not a
"person" within the statute 1 authorizing actions for declaratory judgments.
Th(! intermediate court of appeal reversed.I' On appeal, held that municipal corporations may be sued under the declaratory j_udgment act. In practical application, the statute has been given such a construction since its enactment in 1921,
although the question has never been raised before this court and two recent
appellate court decisions have reached a contrary conclusion. The general rule
is that "person" may be construed to include a governmental agency'if the result
of such construction would not be to infringe sovereign governmental powers.
The statutes of this state permit suits by and against municipal corporations. The
declaratory judgment act involves only matters of practice and procedure; it
does not affect liability, and consequently does .not impair governmental sovereignty. The same rule applies to counties. The provision of the charter is construed contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, however, and the judgment in favor
of defendants is consequently affirmed. Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commis.sioners, (Cal. 1942) 132 P. (2d) 804.8
LABOR LAW -- INJUNCTIONS - MEANING OF "LABOR DISPUTE" Plaintiffs, as copartners under the name "World Cafeteria," sought an injunction against the Cafeteria Employees Union to restrain defendants from picketing phlintiffs' cafeteria. At the time the picketing began plaintiff Loizides owned
1 Annotations on furnishing of medical services or supplies as constituting insurance are found in 63 A. L. R. 711 at 731 (1929); 100 A. L. R. 1449 at 1456
(1936); n9 A. L. R. 1241 at 1245 (1939). For general discussions of what constitutes insurance, see 36 M1cH. L. REV, 3II (1937); 37 M1cH. L. REV. 138 (1938).
1
2
3

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1941), § 1060.
(Cal. App. 1942) 126 P. (2d) 416.
See 30 CAL. L. REv. 682 (1942).
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a restaurant and the other six plaintiffs were his employees. Defendants tried
to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with Loizides and he refused.
The union then picketed the restaurant, using only one picket. Loizides, for the
sole purpose of removing the picket, called together his employees and signed a
document which made them all his partners. Thereafter the present suit was
begun. The trial court found there was no labor dispute within the New York
statute 1 restricting injunctions in labor disputes, and granted the injunction.
The Appellate Division affirmed. 2 Held, affirmed. The trial court's findings of
fact must be accepted, and it having been found that there was a bona fide partnership, the purpose for which it was formed is immaterial. Since there was no
employment, there was no labor dispute. While the picketing was peaceful, the
injunction was properly granted on the ground that the pickets bore false and
misleading signs and made untrue statements to prospective customers. Three
judges dissented on the ground that the existence of a labor dispute on the
facts here involved was a matter of law, not of fact, and that a labor dispute
which once existed could not be stopped by the device of a partnership. Angelos
v. Mesevich, 289 N. Y. 498, 46 N. E. (2d) 903 (1943). 3
MANDAMUS - Am oF APPELLATE JURISDICTION - ERROR oF LowER
CouRT IN STRIKING OuT PLEA OF ABATEMENT-Respondents, the Evaporated Milk Association and others, were indicted by a federal grand jury for a
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. Respondents filed pleas in abatement on the ground that the subject of the indictment was not within the scope
of the grand jury's power. After filing and withdrawing replications of denial,
the government filed demurrers to the pleas and motions to, strike them because
they were insufficient in law, failed to state facts with sufficient certainty and
alleged facts which could not be within the pleaders' knowledge. The district court sustained the demurrers and granted the motions. Respondents then
petitioned the ninth circuit court of appeals for a writ of mandamus directing
petitioner district judge to reinstate the pleas in abatement and to set the
issues thereon for jury trial. The writ was issued 1 and petitioner brought
certiorari. Held, reversed. A circuit court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction
N. Y. Civil Practice Act. (Cahill, 1937), § 876-a.
264 App. Div. 708, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 408 (1942).
8
On a case where employees were made stockholders, see 9 FORDHAM L. REv.
127 (1940). And on various problems of what constitutes a "labor dispute," see 35
MICH. L. REv. 1320 (1937); 36 MICH. L. REv. 1146 (1938); 41 MICH. L. REv.
539 (1943); 19 BoST. UNiv. L. REV. l 146 (1938); 41 MICH. L. REv. 539 (1943);
19 BoST. UNiv. L. REv. 137, 321 (1939); 16 UNiv. CIN. L. REv. 183 (1942); 23
CoRN. L. Q. 339 (1938); 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 980 (1940); 13 IND. L. J. 516
(1938); 15 N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 116 (1937); 16 N. C. L. REv. 411 (1938);
86 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 784 (1938); IO RcKY. MT. L. REv. 193 (1938); 24 VA. L.
REV. 684 (1938); 28 VA. L. REV. 829 (1942).
1

2

1

Evaporated Milk Assn. v. Roche, (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 843, noted
56 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1943).
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only, and writs issued by it must be in aid of such jurisdiction.2 Mandamus may
be used to remove obstacles to appeal, but not merely as a substitute for the appeal
procedure prescribed by statutes. There is no question of the jurisdiction of the
district court. The circuit court acted on the theory that by striking out the
pleas in abatement the district court refused to pass on them and therefore made
an appeal from its decision under the statute 8 impossible. Actually the district
court decided that the pleas were insufficient in law. It may have acted erroneously, but it did not abuse judicial power and any error may be rev1ewed upon
appeal after final judgment. The resulting inconvenience of a perhaps long and
costly trial must have ~een contemplated by Congress in providing that only
final judgments should be reviewable. The alternative is to make possible
numerous appeals in the same case. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., (U. S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 938. 4
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

BANKRUPTCY- COMPOSITION OF MUNI-

DEBTS--FAIRNESS OF PLAN-In a proceeding under Chapter IX of
the Bankruptcy Act 1 the town of Belleair, Florida, filed a petition for confirmation of a plan of composition of its debts. The plan was approved by
sixty-eight per cent of the municipality's debtors, who also owned an appreciable
quantity of taxable property in the city. A large portion of the bonds had been
acquired at a discount for the purpose of instituting bankruptcy proceedings.
The proposed plan provided for the retirement of bonds held by property-owning holders on the same basis as those held by nonproperty-owning holders. It
was shown that after the plan was consummated the indebtedness of the city
would be substantially reduced, tax levies would be appreciably lessened and
property values correspondingly enhanced. These benefits received by the
property-owning bondholders were substantial inducements toward approval of
the plan. The district court refused to confirm the proposal on the ground that
the plan was not fair and equitable and that it discriminated in favor of one
class of creditors against another.2 Held, affirmed. Town of Belleair v. Gro'Ues,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 542, cert. den. (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct.
762.s
CIPAL

PARTIES CLASS _Surr - INTERVENTION OF REPRESENTED PARTY Kruzan, a taxpayer of the city of Terre Haute, brought action in July 1938 on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated to determine the respective
rights of the city and the Rose Polytechnic Institute in a certain trust fund. A

Judicial Code, § 262, 28 U.S. C. (1940), § 377.
56 Stat. L. 271 (1942), 18 U.S. C. A. (supp. 1943), § 682.
4 Cf.annotations on mandamus to compel court to assume or exercise jurisdiction
where it has erroneously dismissed the cause or refused to proceed on ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction. 4 A. L. R. 582 (1919); 82 A. L. R. II63 (1933).
2

8

1

52 Stat. L. 883 (1938), as amended,

II

U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1943), § 401

et seq.
2
8

Id., § 403 (e).
See 39 MICH. L. REv. 1412 (1941); 27 CAL.

t. REv.

740 (1939).
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trust of $150,000 to construct a new sewer system had been established by a
will providing that if the city failed to accept the gift within two years or failed
to raise an additional sum of $150,000 or enough to complete the sewer, the
fund should be paid to the Rose Polytechnic Institute. The Institute filed a
cross complaint claiming that the conditions had not been met. In March 1941,
appellant Barnard filed petition to intervene, alleging that he was a member of
the class for whom the action was brought, that since bringing the action
Kruzan had become city comptroller and was no longer a representative of the
taxpayers, that Kruzan did not intend to pursue the action, and that if Kruzan
continued as sole plaintiff there would be fraud and collusion to the injury of
the taxpayers. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike out ~e petition to intervene,
which the court granted. On appeal, held, reversed. The trial court made no
ruling on the merits of the petition to intervene, so the facts alleged must be
assumed to be true. If so, they show a right in appellant to intervene. The
case must be remanded for a hearing on the merits of the petition to intervene.
Barnard v. Kruzan, (Ind. 1943) 46 N. E. (2d) 238.1
TAXATION - GIFT TAX - CoRRELATION WITH EsTATE TAX - Petitioner made an irrevocable trust of corporate stock, the income payable to his
wife for life and upon her death the corpus to be returned to petitioner, if living;
if he was not living, the corpus was to go to such persons as the wife might
designate by will or in default of a will to her intestate successors. The petitioner
paid under protest a gift tax on the total value of the trust principal and sued
for refund. He conceded that the life state was subject to the gift tax, while
the government conceded that the reversion was immune from gift tax. The
district court 1 held that the remainder was not completely transferred and was
not subject to gift tax. The circuit court of appeals 2 reversed. On certiorari,
held, affirming the circuit court, the remainder is subject to gift tax. "The
essence of a gift by trust is the abandonment of control over the property put in
trust." The present case is distinguishable from the Guggenheim 8 and Sanford 4
cases in that the grantor has here relinquished all control unless he outlives his
wife. Moreover, the same transfer may be taxable under both the gift and estate
taxes. Justice Roberts dissented. Smith v. Shaughnessy, (U. S. 1943) 63
S. Ct. 545.15
1 See 25 VAL. REv. 606, esp. 613-614 (1939); and generally on intervention,
43 YALE L. J. 127 (1934). Cf. Wheaton, "Representative Suits Involving Numerous
Litigants," 19 CoRN, L. Q. 399 (1934); annotation on right of intervenor to control
of class suit, 91 A. L. R. 587 (1934).

(D. C. N. Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 19.
(C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 742.
3 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933).
4 Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1940),noted
38 MrcH. L. REV, 566 (1940). See also 38 MrcH L. REv. 1350 (1940).
15 Accord, Robinette v. Helvering, (U. S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 540, where the remainder was wholly contingent, being to the unborn issue of the life tenant.
1

2

1208

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

TAXATION - INCOME TAX - FORGIVENESS OF DEBTS AS GIFTS - Creditors of the taxpayer, a corporation, forgave interest on notes representing past
due bills for merchandise and also partially forgave back rent. It was not
shown that the taxpayer was insolvent. The taxpayer credited the total of the
cancelled debts to earned surplus, reporting no part thereof as taxable income.
The commissioner added this amount to the taxpayer's reported income and the
taxpayer sought a redetermination on the ground that the cancellations were
gifts and so exempt from tax as income. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed
the commissioner's determination of a deficiency.1 The circuit court of appeals·
reversed. 2 On certiorari, held, the cancellations were ·gifts and so exempt.3
Where the taxpayer purchased its own bonds at a discount the increase in net
assets was held a taxable gain. 4 But where the indebtedness represented the
purchase price of property, a partial forgiveness has been treated as a readjustment of the contract.5 And where a stockholder gratuitously forgives the corporation's debt to himself, the transaction has long been recognized by the
Treasury as a contribution to the capital of the corporation.6 The Chandler Act
provides that adjustments in indebtedness of a debtor shall not be recognized as
income.1 The Revenue Act of I 942 has cleared up uncertainties by granting
the same exclusion to all corporations, whether or not :financially sound.8 The
statutory definition of income is broad, but "gift" is also a generic term and a
release to the debtor of something for nothing is a gift even though the creditors
may have acted for business reasons rather than from pure generosity. Frankfurter and Jackson dissented. Helvering v. American Dental Co., (U. S.
1943) 63 S. Ct. 577 (1943).9
TAXATION-INCOME TAX-STOCK DIVIDENDS-EISNER v. MACOMBER RENEWED - During 1939 respondent owned 101 shares of common
stock of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Twice during that year
the corporation made appropriate transfers from earned surplus to capital accounts and against them issued stock dividends. These dividends were in com44 B. T. A. 425 (1941).
American Dental Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 254.
8 49 Stat. L. 1648 at 1657, § 22 (a) and (b) (3) (1936).
4 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 52 S. Ct. 4 (1932).
G Hirsch v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) II5 F. (2d) 656; Helvering v.
A. L. Killian Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 433; Gehring J'ub. Co. v. Commission~, l T. C. 345 (1942).
6 Treas. Reg. 45 ( 1921), art. 51, and •in all subsequent regulations to Treas. Reg.
94 (1936), art. 22 .(a)-14; Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor .Co., (C. C. A.
2d, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 226.
1 In chapters 10, II, 12, 13 and 15-, S?- Stat. L. 904, 915, 938, u40 (1938),
II u. s. C. (1940), §§ 668,796,920, 1079.
8 Pub. L. 753, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), § 114, 26 U.S. C. A. (Supp. 1943),
§ 22 (b) (9).
9 See Warren and Sugarman, "Cancellation of Indebtedness and Its Ta:x: Consequences," 49 CoL. L. REv. 1326 (1940), 41 id. 61 (1941); Grahams, "Is Cancellation of Indebtedness Income," 16 TAX MAG. 707 (1938).
1

2
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mon stock identical with the stock on which they were declared. Respondent
received stock dividends of a market value of $42.93 and $66.08 respectively,
and did not report them as income. The commissioner assessed a deficiency of
$9.60. The Board of Tax Appeals 1 reversed his determination and the circuit
court of appeals 2 affirmed on the authority of Eisner 'ii, Macomber,8 which held
that stock dividends that conferred no di:fferent rights or interest than the old
stock were not "income" within the Sixteenth Amendment. On certiorari, held,
affirmed. The government contended that under the applicable statute "dividends" are income and that the particular kind of dividends here received were
not within the exception of a distribution of stock that "does not constitute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution." 4 However, "does not constitute" must be construed to
mean under existing decisions of the Supreme Court, i.e., theMacomber case.
Moreover, the statements of members of Congress and Treasury officials at the
hearings on the similar Revenue Act for 1936, the Congressional debates, and
Treasury Regul~tions all assumed that the rule of Eisner v. Macomber was still
in effect. While recent decisions 5 of the Court have made gradual inroads on
the rule, the Court cannot reconsider the question until it is squarely presented
by a statute which purports to tax such dividends. A retroactive decision in the
present case would unsettle tax returns in which the gain on sale of dividend
stock has been taxed at a higher rate than if taxed when the dividend was declared, and would likewise unsettle refusals of deductions for the undistributed
profits tax. Helvering'il. Griffiths, (U.S. 1943) 63 S. Ct. 636.6
TAXATION - ESTATE TAX - VALIDITY OF STATUTE PROVIDING FOR
DISTRIBUTION OF BURDEN - A New York statute 1 provides that unless
Sylvie R. Griffiths, 3 CCH. FEDERAL TAX SERVICE, 1f 7433-D (1942).
z Commissioner v. Griffiths, (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 321.
8 252 U.S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920), noted 18 MICH. L. REV. 689 (1920).
For some of the numerous other comments, see principal case, 63 S. Ct. at 638, note 4.
4 53 Stat. L. 1 at 9, 47 (1939), Int. Rev. Code,§§ 22 (a), II5 {f) (1).
5 Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767 (1936), noted 35 M1cH.
L. REV. 692 (1937), holding that a dividend on preferred stock of shares of common
stock was income; Helvering v. Brunn, 309 U.S. 461, 60 S. Ct. 631 (1940), noted
38 MICH. L. REV. 1356 (1940), which rejected the concept that taxable gain could
arise only when the taxpayer was able to sever increment from his original capital;
Helvering v. Horst, 3 l l U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144 (1940), noted 39 MicH L. REv.
495 (1941), holding there was no exemption from taxation where economic gain is
enjoyed "by some event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of property or
money."
8 See 36 MicH. L. REv. 673 (1938); Mertens, "Recent Income Tax Trends in
Stock Dividend Cases," 27 CoRN. L. Q. 449 (1942); 51 HARv. L. REv. 702 (1938);
55 HAR.v. L. REv. 683 (1942). Annotations on income tax and stock dividends are
found in 9 A. L. R. 1594 (1920); 105 A. L. R. 761 (1936); 130 A. L. R. 408
(1941); 143 A. L. R. 230, 596 (1943).
1

1 N. Y. Laws (1930), c. 709, 13 Consol. Laws {McKinney, 1939), ''Decedent
Estate Law," § l 24,
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otherwise directed by will, the burden of the federal death taxes shall be spread
proportionately among the distributees or beneficiaries of the estate. The wi11 in
question made outright gifts and created a trust of life estates with remainders,
but contained no reference to the payment of estate or inheritance taxes. To the
executor's petition for equitable distribution of estate taxes, respondent life
tenants objected on the ground that the statute was repugnant to the federal tax
statutes. The New York Court of Appeals reversed a decision of the surrogate
directing apportionment.2 On certiorari, held, the New York statute is constitutional. All the provisions of federal law, from the earliest estate tax to the present, tax the estate as a whole and seem to contemplate that local law shall govern
the distribution of the burden on the beneficiaries. Riggs v. del Drago, 3 I 7

U.S. 95, 63 S. ·ct. 109 (1942).

WILLS- CONSTRUCTION RIGHT OF LIFE TENANT TO TAKE UNDER
LIMITATION OVER TO NEXT OF KIN OF TESTATOR - Suit in equity to construe a will. The clause in question gave to testator's wife "the use, benefit and
enjoyment of the income of the balance of my estate for and during the term of
her natural life, and after her death, I give, bequeath and devise said residue of
my estate ••• to my next of kin in equal shares in fee." At the time of testator's
death he left no children, but two brothers and the children of a deceased
brother. Under the statute the widow would then have been the sole next of
kin. One of the brothers died before the widow and at her death there were one
brother and nine nephews and nieces. The widow left a will, and her executor
claimed the entire residue. Held, that the language of testator's will clearly indicates that the widow was to have a life estate only and the residue vests in the
next of kin after the death of the widow. Francisco v. Bailey, (N. J. Ch.

1943) 29 A. (2d) 884.1

-

2 ln re Del Drago's Estate, 287 N. Y. 61, 38 N. E. (2d) 131° (1942), reversing
175 Misc. 489, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (1941). This case has been noted in the following reviews (all 1942): 42 CoL. L. REV. 708; 27 CoRN. L. Q. 280; II FoRDHAM
L. REV. 223; IO GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 746; 30 GEo. L. J. 485; 31 GEo. L. J. 230
(1943); 55 HARV. L. REv. 1053; 19 N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 319; 9 UNIV. CHI. L.
REv. 528; 90 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 623; 51 YALE L. J. 1202.

1 See Ferrier, "Gifts to 'Heirs' in California," 26 CAL L. REV. 413 at 419
(1938); annotations on right of devisees of precedent estate to take under limitation
over to heirs or next of kin of testator, 13 A. L. R. 615 (1921), 20 A. L. R. 356
(1922), 30 A. L. R. 915 (1924), 49 A. L. R. IOII (1929). Cf., on time of determining members of class to whom future gift is made, 49 A. L. R. 174 (1927),
127 A. L. R. 602 (1940).
.

